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ABSTRACT 
The chapter analyzes and compares the investment incentives of platform and 
application developers for Linux and Windows. We find that the level of investment 
in applications is larger when the operating system is open source rather than 
proprietary. The comparison of the levels of investment in the operating systems 
depends, among others, on reputation effects and the number of developers. The 
chapter also develops a short case study comparing Windows and Linux and 
identifies new directions for open source software research. 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Open source software is an emerging type of software that may fundamentally 
affect the business and economic features of the software industry. Linux, an open 
source operating system, has been the prominent example of the potential of the 
open source movement, competing against Microsoft Windows, the incumbent 
operating system. 
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This chapter analyzes the incentives to invest in application software and an 
operating system under two different software ecosystems: one based on an open 
source operating system, such as Linux, and the other based on a proprietary 
operating system, such as Microsoft Windows. We build a model extending 
Economides and Katsamakas (2005) to compare the innovation incentives of 
application developers and operating system developers for Linux and Windows. 
In our model, firms and developers invest to improve the quality of the platform 
or the application and expand the demand by users of these software products. 
When the operating system is proprietary, the platform provider and the appli- 
cation provider invest only in their own product to maximize their profit. When 
the operating system is open source, there is no platform provider firm, but the 
users invest in the platform to maximize their user surplus and their develop- 
ment reputation, which depends on the success of the platform measured by 
its adoption. This modeling approach is justified by other open source research 
that conceptualizes the users as developers (Franke and von Hippel 2003, von 
Hippel 2005). 
Another innovation of our model is that it considers the strategic interac- 
tion between the platform developers' investment incentives and the application 
developers' incentives. We show that this interaction is important and should not 
be ignored in public policy. The existing debate of how innovati0n.i~ affected 
by open vs. proprietary platforms (e.g. Lessig 2001) tends to focus only on the 
innovation incentives of application providers, ignoring the relationship of these 
incentives with the incentives of the platform provider. 
Beyond the analysis of investment incentives, we also present a short case 
study comparing Windows vs. Linux along three dimensions: the client-side, 
the server-side and the interaction between the client-side and the server-side. 
We emphasize that the comparison between Windows and Linux is an issue 
of comparing two competing software ecosystems, not just two products. The 
existing Windows ecosystem of the operating system, applications, application 
developers and service providers is competing against an emerging ecosystem 
centered on the Linux operating system. The short case study enables us to 
identify directions for future research on open source software. 
The main findings of our analysis are the following. First, the level of invest- 
ment in the application is larger when the operating system is open source rather 
than proprietary, when the two operating systems are of equal quality. Second, 
the level of investment in the operating system depends on a number of factors 
such as the strength of the reputation effects for the developers of the open source 
operating system, the ratio of developers within the total user population of the 
open source operating system, the level of investment in the applications within 
each ecosystem and the cost of adopting the open source operating system. An 
increase in one the first two factors leads to a relative increase in the investment 
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in the open source operating system, while an increase in the fourth factor leads 
to a relative increase in the investment in the proprietary operating system. 
The chapter has the following structure. Section 10.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 10.3 discusses the case study of Windows vs. Linux and 
identifies some new research directions. Section 10.4 develops the model and 
analyzes the innovation incentives in the two alternative software ecosystems, 
the open source and the proprietary one. Section 10.5 concludes the chapter. 
10.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature on economics of open source focuses mainly on the individ- 
ual incentives to participate in open source projects, the incentives of firms to 
adopt open source initiatives, the business models of firms operating within the 
open source landscape and the competitive implications of open source software 
(Lerner and Tirole 2004, Chapter 2 of this book).' Johnson (2002) models the 
contribution to an open source project as a problem of private provision of a 
public good and analyzes the effect of increasing the number of developers. 
Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002) discuss the incentives of individual program- 
mers and software firms to participate in open source projects. They argue that 
programmers are motivated by "peer recognition" and delayed career benefits 
such as being hired by a software firm, or getting access to funding for future 
software ventures. Mustonen (2003) proposes a model in which the participation 
of programmers in open source projects is endogenous and shows that a low 
implementation cost of an open source application is crucial for its survival 
when it competes with a proprietary application. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghe- 
mawat (2003) study a dynamic setting of competition between Windows and 
Linux. Bitzer (2004) analyzes why some software firms support Linux depend- 
ing on the heterogeneity between Linux and the firms' commercial products. 
Economides and Katsamakas (2005) analyze the strategic differences between 
a proprietary and an open source technology platform and their competition. 
Mustonen (2005) analyzes when a proprietary software firm may support the 
development of substitute open source software. Comino and Manenti (2005) 
assume informed and uninformed users about the existence of open source appli- 
cations, and study the welfare implications of public policies supporting open 
source software. 
Perhaps the closest paper to this one is that of Bitzer and Schroder (2003), 
which also analyzes the innovation performance of open source and proprietary 
' DiBonna and Ockman (1999). Raymond (2001) and Fink (2003) provide good practitioner overviews of 
open source software. 
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software development, see also Chapter 12. It shows that competition between 
open source and proprietary products leads to an increase in the level of tech- 
nology of both products, as a result of increased investment. The focus of Bitzer 
and Schroder (2003) is on the effect of competition on innovation, while the 
focus of our chapter is on a direct comparison of the innovation in the two alter- 
native software ecosystems, which consist of application and operating system 
developers. 
10.3 CASE STUDY: 1,INIJX VS. WINDOWS 
This case study of Linux vs. Windows distinguishes between the operating 
systems market for end users - of a desktop operating system (client) - and the 
market for server operating systems (server). The most interesting battle today 
is at the server-side. 
Some studies suggest that the market-share of Linux at the client-side is around 
3% and some expect it to reach 7% by 2007.' This slow growth can be attributed 
to lack of ease of use, small variety of applications and problems with drivers 
that enable users to connect other devices to their computing systems. Linux has 
been mostly an operating system for power-users who have Unix-like skills, but 
this may change since the open source community is developing several friendly 
user interfaces such as KDE. 
Switching costs from the dominant Windows operating system make it difficult 
for the Linux market-share to grow fast. Much depends on the relative availability 
of applications for Windows vs. Linux and the switching costs from the Windows 
ecosystem to the Linux ecosystem. There are many open source applications 
under development, and the open source community has recognized the strategic 
importance of making their applications similar to the Windows applications to 
lower user switching costs. 
Many open source applications (such as Openoffice, the Mozilla Firefox 
browser etc.) are also compatible with Windows. Although these applications 
increase the recognition of the open source community, they strengthen the Win- 
dows ecosystem and therefore may hurt Linux in its competition with Windows 
in the short term. However, the existence of these open source applications may 
reduce the switching cost to Linux in the long term. At the same time, there are 
many proprietary applications that are offered over the Linux operating system. 
Therefore, we do not see a pure open source ecosystem competing with a pure 
' See http://www.idc.corn. 
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proprietary ecosystem, but two ecosystems both based on a mix of open source 
and proprietary applications. Understanding the strategic implications of these 
mixed ecosystems is an interesting question for future research. 
At the server-side, IDC predicts double-digit growth of Linux adoption3 and 
that Linux server shipments will reach 25.7% of total shipments in 2008. Linux 
is "becoming mainstream" and the Linux-based packaged software market is 
expected to exceed $14 million by 2008.4 
The total cost of ownership (TCO) of Linux may be higher pre~ently.~ The 
migration from Windows environments to Linux is more costly than the migra- 
tion from Unix to Linux, since Linux is a Unix-like operating system. 'Therefore 
a significant switching cost is protecting Windows. Both Windows and Linux 
are gaining market share at the expense of proprietary Unix systems (including 
the Sun versions of Unix), which tend to be closed and expensive running on 
expensive hardware. 
The Linux ecosystem is developing fast in terms of number, variety and quality 
of applications and availability of support and other complementary services. 
However, it is expected that firms that offer competing proprietary solutions 
will respond in a variety of ways, including the reduction of prices and higher 
investment in their products. For example, Microsoft seems committed to reduce 
the security issues faced by Windows. Uncertainty about potential litigation 
risks due to unclear property rights and confusing open source licenses also 
hurts Linux. 
Sponsoring of Linux by big IT companies such as IBM and HP is affect- 
ing positively Linux because it affects the expectations of customers about the 
prospects of the platform. These firms are sponsoring Linux by developing or 
porting their enterprise applications to Linux (such as IBM Websphere), partic- 
ipating actively in open source projects and initiatives and sometimes leading 
open source projects, announcing publicly their support and their positive expec- 
tations about Linux. Sponsoring of Linux by European and Asian governments 
also strengthens Linux. 
Security problems and risks are hurting Windows. An independent study 
has shown that Linux kernel has 0.17 security flaws per 1,000 lines of code, 
compared to average 10-20 flaws of proprietary  oftw ware.^ 
' eWeek reports "IDC sees double digit growth continuing for Linux", 8 December 2004 at 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1737068,00.asp. 
' See http://www.idc.com. 
' See "Yankee independently pits Windows TCO vs. Linux T C O ,  Microsoft Watch. 24 March 2004, 
http://www.microsoft-watch.comIarticle2/0,1995,1553620,00.asp. 
' See "Linux kernel review shows far fewer flaws", eWeek, 14 December 2004, at http://www.eweek.comI 
article2/0.1759,1741077,00.asp. 
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Firms have the option to compile their own for free Linux distribution, by 
bundling the free Linux kernel with select utilities, but there are several com- 
peting commercial Linux distributions (such as Red Hat, SuSe e t~. ) .  Therefore 
there is competition within the Linux platform itself, besides the competition 
between Linux and Windows. There is a need for more research to analyze 
that competition and understand the strategies of competing Linux distributors. 
There is an ongoing process of standardization7 across the different distributions, 
ensuring that a Linux application can run on all distributions. However, it is 
uncertain how successful this process will be in the future and whether the risk 
of "forking" to incompatible distributions will materialize. The risk of "forlung" 
is affecting negatively the expectations of potential adopters and the costs of 
application developers for Linux, who may need to develop different versions 
of their applications for different Linux distributions. 
The existing literature tends to focus on the development side and not on 
the demand side. It is unclear how and where firms choose to adopt Linux and 
open source applications. This may depend on the existing IT infrastructure, 
capabilities and employee IT skills of a firm, the size and the industry of the firm. 
Only firms with substantial IT capabilities and resources may switch early. Most 
firms are likely to have a mix of Linux and Windows infrastructure evolving over 
time. For example, Linux tends to become dominant in Web serving applications, 
combined with Apache, the dominant Web server application that is open s ~ u r c e . ~  
Prominent Internet companies such as Google and Amazon rely heavily on 
Linux. There is a need for both empirical and analytical work on the conditions 
under which firms adopt Linux and open source, and how this adoption behavior 
affects the competition between the two ecosystems. 
10.3.3 Interaction of Server-Side and Client-Side 
There is also a significant relationship between the clientldesktop-side and the 
server-side within an enterprise IT infrastructure. Since Microsoft is expected to 
have dominance at the client operating systems market (and many applications) 
for a long time this may give it an advantage at the server market too. Alterna- 
tively, as Linux increases its presence at the server market, this may encourage 
its adoption at the client market as well. The European Union court decision, 
requiring Microsoft to publish some proprietary protocols that define the inter- 
action of clients and servers, may make it easier to introduce Linux clients in 
networks that depend on Windows s e r ~ e r s . ~  
' Linux Standards Base (LSB), see http://www.linuxbase.org. 
Apache's market-share is larger than 68%. Microsoft's IIS market-share is around 20% and the difference 
between the two is increasing over time; see "Web server survey", Netcraft. January 2005, at http://news. 
netcraft.com/archives/2005/01/01/jan~ary~2005~~eb~server~su~~ey.html 
See "Microsoft's secret codes", Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2004. 
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10.4 THE MODEL 
This section provides a brief overview of the technology platforms model of 
Economides and Katsamakas (2005) and extends that model to analyze the 
investment incentives of different platforms. 
The model consists of two software ecosystems, the first based on a proprietary 
platform and the second based on an open source platform. 
The software ecosystem based on the proprietary platform consists of one 
platform firm selling the platform A, (operating system), and an independent 
application developer selling B, (application software). The platform firm sells 
the platform to the users at a price p,. The independent application provider 
sells the application to the users at a price p,. The application provider pays 
also an access fee s to the platform firm. The fee s is set by the platform firm 
and it can be negative when effectively the operating system firm subsidizes 
the application developer. The demand function of the platform A, is q, = 
a, - bopo - dp,,  and the demand of the application B, is 9, = a,  - blp l  - dp,, 
where parameter d measures the complementarity between the platform and the 
application. We assume that b,, bo > d, i.e. the own-price effect of each product 
dominates the cross-price effect. The profit function of the platform firm is 
.rro = poqo + sq l ,  equal to the platform profit from users plus the platform profit 
from the application access fees. The profit function of the application provider 
is .rrl = (p, - s)g,. The marginal cost of production is zero for both the platform 
and the application, because both are software products easy to reproduce. The 
firms set prices in a two-stage game. In stage one, the platform sets the access fee 
s paid by the application provider. In stage two, the platform and the application 
provider set the user prices p , ,  p, simultaneously. 
The software ecosystem based on an open source platform consists of users- 
developers that help develop the open source platform A:, which is adopted by 
users for free, and an independent application provider firm that develops and 
sells the application BY at price pY. The demand for the platform A: is q: = 
a: - b,e, - dpy, and the demand for the application By is qp = a? - blp? - dc,. 
Under open source, the profit function of the operating system is zero and the 
profit function of the application provider is .rrp = PpqF We also assume that 
open source platform users may face an additional exogenous adoption cost c,.1° 
At equilibrium, when the operating system is proprietary, the operating system 
and application profits excluding investment costs are 
"' As noted in the case study (Section 10.3), there is evidence that the TCO of Linux is possibly higher than 
the TCO of Windows, at least for now. 
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respectively. Alternatively, when the operating system is open source, equilib- 
rium profits are 
and the combined consumer surplus from the operating systems and applications 
markets is 
The following section extends this basic framework by introducing new mod- 
eling features and assumptions that enable us to analyze and compare the inno- 
vation incentives in the two ecosystems. 
10.4.1 Innovation Incentives 
Before the operating systems and the applications are offered to users as defined 
above, the software firms and individual developers may invest in increasing 
a, (effectively increasing the quality of the software product), expanding the 
demand of the operating system and the applications. We show that the incentives 
to invest differ across operating systems, and we characterize the relative strength 
of these incentives. 
When the operating system is proprietary, we assume that (a) each firm 
invests in its product to maximize its profit; and (b) neither the users nor the 
application providers invest in the platform because the platform is closed. 
For example, the quality of Microsoft Windows depends almost exclusively on 
Microsoft's investment in this operating system. 
When the operating system is open source, we assume that there are D users 
that are developers, and define the proportion of such users as 6 = 4 < 1. The 
40 
developers invest in the open source platform so that that they maximize the 
user/consumer surplus CSO from the open source platform plus their reputation 
value R (q:), where R(.) is an increasing function of the adoption of the open 
source platform. The intuition is that a high adoption of the open platform is a 
signal of success and all the developers that participated expect some future ben- 
efits from that (e.g., future job opportunities). Indeed the development of Linux 
depends crucially on investment of time and effort of individual developers who 
also use Linux as an operating system to run the applications they use (Raymond 
2001). We assume that the application provider invests in the application, and 
they may invest on the platform too. 
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The game now has an investment stage that precedes the two pricing stages 
described at the beginning of Section 10.4. We assume that the investment has a 
fixed cost reflecting the high fixed cost and low variable cost structure of software 
development. We assume that by investing in a product (operating system or 
application), the sponsor is able to push outwards (increase) the demand for 
the product, here measured by the parameter a,. The firm incurs a fixed'cost 
indicated by the increasing and convex investment function C(a,). 
Assuming concavity of the profit functions, optimal choice of investment for 
profit maximization when the operating system is proprietary requires 
Operating System: 





aa, duo 2 (bob, - d 2 )  aao ' 
Application : 
The conditions for developer utility maximization and application firm profit 
maximization when the operating system is open source are 
Operating System: 
Application: 
an1 ac(a?) + = ac(ap)  
day - day 2b1 aa? ' 
We can now prove the following proposition comparing investment incentives 
in operating systems and applications in the two ecosystems, as described by 
Equations (10.1)-(10.4). 
Proposition 1 Provided that the cost function for software development is the 
same for open source and proprietary developers and that the open source 
operating system is offered for free, investment in the application is higher 
when the operating system is open source, i.e. a ,  < a?. Investment in the open 
source operating system is larger than investment in the proprietary operating 
system if there are strong reputation effects from participation in open source 
development, and/or a significant part of the open source users are developers 
and the difference in application investments, a? - a, ,  is not large. Conversely, 
investment in a proprietary operating system is smaller when there are weak 
reputation effects from participation in open source development, andor only 
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a small part of the open source users are developers and the diflerence in 
application investment levels, a? - a , ,  is large. 
Proof: First, compare the maximization conditions of the applications, Equations 
2al (2hOhl+d2)2 (10.2) and (10.4). Since < ? for all a, ,  and the cost function is 
b, (8bobl +d2)' L h l  
convex in a , ,  it follows that a ,  < a?. Now compare the maximization conditions 
of the operating systems. Because the cost function is convex, the investment in 
the open source operating system is larger if and only if 
First, assume that the marginal value of reputation is zero for the open source 
developers. Then if S 5 and Sap >_ ?, since b,b, - d2 > 0, it follows that 
Equation (10.5) is false, therefore a: < a,. If 8 > and a? - a ,  is not large, i.e. 
if Sap i then Equation (10.5) is true, and therefore a, < a:. Alternatively, 
since the marginal value of reputation is positive, a strong enough reputation 
2 aR effect such that aobl ( S  - i) + d (9 - Sap) i 6 (bobl - d ) is sufficient to 
fulfill Equation (10.5) and result in a, < a:. 
The proposition suggests that the investment in the application is stronger when 
the operating system is open source. However, the comparison of investment 
levels in the operating system is ambiguous. When there are strong reputa- 
tion effects from participation in the development of the open source operating 
system, or a significant proportion of the users have also development skills, 
then the investment in the open source operating system is also larger than the 
investment of a firm controlling a proprietary operating system. The proposition 
captures both the reputation benefits and the usage benefits of participants in 
widely adopted open source projects. 
The application provider for the open source operating system invests more 
than the application provider for the proprietary operating system because the 
first has a larger marginal profit for all levels of investment. This is because 
the open source operating system is adopted by users for free, enabling the 
application provider to set a larger price and capture a larger profit than the 
application provider for the proprietary operating system. 
The level of investment in the applications affects the level of investment in 
the operating system because of the complementarity between the application 
and the operating system. In particular, when the level of investment in the 
application increases, the marginal benefit of investing in the operating system 
decreases, as shown in Equations (10.1) and (10.3). 
Exogenous factors that reduce the adoption of the open source operating sys- 
tem, such as a large adoption cost c,,  decrease the incentives of individual 
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developers to invest in the open source operating system. Therefore, an indepen- 
dent application provider may subsidize the adoption of the open source platform 
not only to increase the sales of its application, but also to increase the incentives 
of developers to invest in the operating system. 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
We developed a model to compare the incentives to invest in the operating system 
and its applications both under open source and proprietary operating systems. 
We found that the comparison of the levels of investment in the operating 
systems is ambiguous, but the investment in applications is stronger when the 
operating system is open source. 
These results were developed under the assumption that the productivity of 
investment is the same for a proprietary and an open source system. This is an 
issue where there is significant disagreement, and both sides (for profit software 
companies and open source developers) claim that their productivity is higher. 
This clearly is an open research issue, but the purposes of this chapter - a change 
of the assumption of the equal productivity of investment in both environments - 
will tend to change our result in favor of the ecosystem that is assumed to have 
higher productivity. For example, if it is assumed that the productivity. of the 
open source development is larger than the productivity of proprietary software 
iiC(ao) development, then - < - for all a, and, everything else being equal, 
duo 
the relative investment in the open source operating system increases; if it is 
assumed that productivity of proprietary software development is higher, the 
relative investment in the proprietary operating system increases. 
An interesting extension of the current model would be the analysis of the 
innovation incentives in a competitive setting and the dynamics of innovation. 
We also developed a short case study of Linux vs. Windows. The discussion 
distinguished between issues that affect the competition at the client-side, the 
server-side and the interaction between the client-side and the sever-side. Besides 
the competition between Linux and Windows, there is a need for more research 
to analyze and understand the strategies of competing Linux distributors. Also 
more research is needed in understanding the switching costs and the open 
source adoption strategies of enterprises. Another important area is the interaction 
between client-side and server-side software products and how this interaction 
affects the competition in the software industry and the success of open source. 
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